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Abstract
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a
search equilibrium framework where search e¤ort among the unemployed is
not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy
involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search
is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions
represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring
costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite
payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit
receipt. The optimal sanction rates implied by our calibrated model are much
higher than the sanction rates typically observed in European labor markets.
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Recent years have seen a revival of interest in “public …nance solutions” to
unemployment problems.1 One strand of theoretical and empirical research
has explored the e¤ects of general labor taxation. A related but much smaller
literature has been concerned with the implications of tax di¤erentiation
across sectors or workers with di¤erent skills. The present paper explores
the case for tax di¤erentiation between “goods” and “services”. Goods are
exclusively produced in the market whereas services are produced in the
market as well as within the households.
Most of the existing literature on taxation and home production has dealt
with e¢ciency aspects, typically under the assumption of competitive labor
markets; see for example Boskin (1974), Sandmo (1990) and Kleven et al
(2000). More recent policy discussions have focused on employment e¤ects
of tax reforms involving lower taxes on services that are close substitutes
to goods produced within the households. Indeed, several European coun-
tries have seen policy initiatives where tax reliefs are introduced on various
“household services” such as gardening, catering, cleaning and repair activi-
ties. The European Union has recently issued a new directive that extended
the range of goods and services that could be subject to reduced tax rates.
The motivation for this amendment was explicitly focused on employment
objectives (Council directive 1999/85/EC).
The literature on tax policies in economies with home production has
only recently addressed issues related to unemployment. Three examples are
Fredriksen et al (1995), Sørensen (1997) and Kolm (2000). The present paper
is most closely related to Kolm’s analysis of tax di¤erentiation in an economy
with union bargaining over wages. Like Kolm we consider an economy with
two market sectors, one of them producing a commodity that is a perfect
substitute to the commodity produced at home. Our model of the labor
market is di¤erent, however. Kolm’s model ignores job search and is partial
equilibrium in the sense that there is no link between bargained wages and
general labor market conditions. The present model features endogenous job
1See for example Sørensen (1997).
2search and bargained wages are a¤ected by overall labor market conditions.
Most of the literature on taxes and unemployment has paid little attention
to income sources other than labor earnings and unemployment bene…ts.2 A
shortcut is to allow for exogenous income or utility components associated
with unemployment, such as income from home production or a …xed value
of leisure; see, for example, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998), Mortensen
(1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). By contrast, our paper develops
a model where the worker’s income from home production is endogenously
determined. We adopt a search equilibrium framework along the lines of Pis-
sarides (1990/2000) and extend it by incorporating home production and two
market sectors.3 Time devoted to home production is here a choice variable
for unemployed individuals who allocate their time between job search and
home production. The cost of search is thus foregone home production. The
unemployed worker’s income is the endogenously determined value of home
production. The real value of home production depends not only on decisions
on time allocation but also on relative prices between goods and services. Tax
policies a¤ect relative prices, a fact that has important implications for the
e¤ects on labor market outcomes.
Section 2 of the paper presents the basic model of a two-sector economy
where services produced in one of the market sectors is a perfect substitute
to services produced at home. The model determines real wages, total and
sectoral employment as well as the relative price between goods and services.
Section 3 turns to the e¤ects of tax policies. We show that a tax cut on
services reduces unemployment whereas a tax cut on goods has no e¤ect. We
also show, in section 4, that the introduction of sectoral tax di¤erentiation,
with lower taxes on services, is welfare improving when the government has an
exogenous revenue requirement. Section 5 of the paper presents the results
2Note however the contributions by Phelps where wealth and nonwage income are key
elements in the theory of unemployment. See Phelps (1994), Phelps and Zoega (1998),
and Hoon and Pelps (1996, 1997).
3Holmlund (2001) presents a one-sector model with home production. Boone and
B o v e n b e r g( 2 0 0 0 )p r o v i d ead e t a i l e dd i s c u s s i o no ft a x a t i o ni no n e - s e c t o rs e a r c hm o d e l s
under di¤erent assumptions about labor demand conditions.
3of numerical calibrations of the model. These exercises suggest that the
optimal tax di¤erential between goods and services can be quite large when
the government absorbs a substantial fraction of GDP. The welfare gains
from optimal tax di¤erentiation are increasing in the government’s revenue
requirement. Section 6 discusses a number of extensions of the basic model
and section 7 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 The Labor Market
The economy consists of two market sectors. One sector produces goods
whereas the other sector produces services. The goods can only be produced
in the market, whereas services can either be produced in the market or
within the households. We denote goods by G and services by Z.
A worker is either unemployed or employed in one of the market sec-
tors. The labor force is …xed and normalized to unity. Workers and …rms
are matched according to a constant-returns-to-scale matching function that
relates the ‡ow of new hires (H) to the total number of vacancies (v)a n d
the e¤ective number of job searchers. Only unemployed workers search for
jobs. In fact, there will be no incentives for on-the-job search in a symmetric
equilibrium since there will be no wage di¤erentials across …rms or sectors
in this case (irrespective of relative tax rates). Let s denote search intensity
and u the number of unemployed. The e¤ective number of searchers is then
given as su. With the labor force normalized to unity, v and u also represent
the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate, respectively. Without loss of




where ´ 2 (0;1) and m is a positive scale parameter. We set m =1in
the subsequent theoretical exposition; in the numerical exercises, m will be
calibrated along with other parameters of the model.
4Workers engage in “undirected” random search for any job, i.e., they do
not direct their search towards any particular sector. For a given amount
of search e¤ort, the probability of locating an o¤er from the goods sector,
say, depends on the number of vacancies in that sector relative to the total
number of vacancies. The transition rate from unemployment to the goods
sector thus generally di¤ers from the transition rate to the service sector as
the relative supply of vacancies may di¤er.4
The sector-speci…c vacancy rates are denoted vj, j = G;Z;h e n c ev =
vG + vZ. The unemployed worker’s transition rates into employment can be
expressed as ¸
G = °sH=su = °sµ
1¡´ = °s®(µ); and ¸
Z =( 1¡ °)sH=su =
(1 ¡ °)sµ
1¡´ =( 1¡ °)s®(µ); ° = vG=v is the fraction of vacancies supplied
by the goods sector and µ = v=su is a measure of overall labor market
tightness. The term s®(µ) can be interpreted as the probability per unit
time of getting any job o¤er, i.e., ¸
G + ¸
Z = s®(µ). The probability per
unit time that a …rm meets a worker is equal across …rms and given by
q(µ)=H=v = µ
¡´. Furthermore, we de…ne labor market tightness for the
goods sector as µ
G = vG=su and labor market tightness for the service sector
as µ
Z = vZ=su,w h e r eµ
G + µ
Z = µ.
The steady state unemployment rate and the sector-speci…c employment
rates, nG and nZ, are derived from the labor force identity, nG +nZ +u =1 ,
and the ‡ow equilibrium conditions. The latter conditions take form ¸
Gu =
ÁnG (the goods sector) and ¸
Zu = ÁnZ (the service sector), where Á is the
exogenous rate at which employed workers are separated from their jobs and
enter unemployment. The separation rates are thus assumed to be equal














4One interpretation of undirected search is that workers locate employers through a
centralized employment agency without knowing in advance the sectoral identity of any
vacancy that comes along. We brie‡y consider “directed” search in Section 6 below. The






















Workers are in…nitely lived and care about consumption of goods and ser-
vices. All workers have identical preferences captured by the homothetic
instantaneous utility function À (G;Z),w h e r eG is the quantity consumed of
goods and Z the quantity consumed of services. Market-produced services
and home-produced services are perfect substitutes in consumption. When
the employed worker acts as a consumer, she takes total income as given by
the bargaining agreements on wages and hours.
The worker’s time endowment is normalized to unity. The employed
worker’s time is divided between market work, lj, and home production, hj,
where index j denotes in which sector the worker is employed, j = G;Z.
The allocation of time is determined in bargains between the …rms and the
individual workers. Unemployed workers allocate their time between search,
s, and home production, hu. An employed worker in sector j has the pro-
duction function zj = z (hj); the unemployed worker’s production function
is analogously given as zu = z(hu). These production functions are identi-
cal across sectors and labor force states, increasing in time devoted to home
production, and strictly concave.
The employed worker’s instantaneous income is given by Ij = wjlj +
R + ¼ + P Zz (hj),w h e r ewj i st h eh o u r l yw a g ea n dlj the number of hours
allocated to market production. R is a lump sum transfer received from
the government, ¼ the share of pro…ts received as dividends, and PZ the
price of services. The aggregate pro…ts generated in the economy are distrib-
uted equally across the population. The unemployed worker’s instantaneous
income is analogously given by Iu = R + ¼ + P Zz (hu). We thus ignore un-
employment bene…ts; the implications of accounting for bene…ts are brie‡y
discussed in section 6 below.
6We can now de…ne the value functions. Let U, EG and EZ denote the
expected present values of unemployment and employment in the two market
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i + R + ¼
P
+ Á(U ¡ E
Z
i ) (7)
where P = P
¡
P G;PZ¢
is the general cost-of living index implied by homo-
thetic preferences. Ej is the value of employment in an arbitrary …rm in
sector j.
The unemployed worker chooses search intensity, si, in order to maximize
the value of unemployment, rUi.5 The …rst-order condition for an interior











The left-hand side is the marginal cost of increasing search, i.e., the real
value of foregone home production. The higher the relative price of services,
the higher the value of foregone home production and thus the higher the
marginal cost of search. The right-hand side is the expected return from an
increase in search e¤ort. The tighter the labor market, the higher the return
to search. It follows immediately that the unemployed worker’s search e¤ort
is decreasing in the relative price of services and increasing in labor market
tightness.
5One can think of the unemployed worker’s behavior as if she …rst acts as a producer
by selling untaxed services to the market in order to maximize pro…ts. In the second stage
she acts as a consumer, choosing optimally between goods and services.
72.3 Firm Behavior and Wage Bargaining
Let Jj and V j represent the expected present values of an occupied job and
a vacant job, respectively. The marginal product of a worker is constant and
denoted y: The (nominal) cost of holding a vacancy open is Pj·y.O n ei n -
terpretation of this speci…cation of the vacancy cost is that the …rm allocates
its workforce optimally between production and recruitment activities. The
cost of hiring is its alternative cost, i.e., the value of the marginal product of
labor.6 There is a proportional payroll tax rate pertaining to sector j that is
denoted tj. (The results are essentially identical with value added taxes, as


























j) j = G;Z (10)
With free entry of vacancies we can impose V j =0and use (9) and (10) to
d e r i v ea“ f e a s i b l e ”r e a lp r o d u c e rw a g e( a l s or e f e r r e dt oa st h e“ z e r o - p r o … t
condition”):








j = G;Z (11)
The feasible wage depends on total labor market tightness and hours of
work. The higher is tightness, the lower the feasible wage since expected
recruitment costs are higher. A rise in working time raises the feasible wage,
which can be thought of as a productivity e¤ect of longer hours. If there is
a rise in work-hours, the …rm can transfer some workers from recruitment
activities to production while keeping its total labor force constant. This
raises output per employee, implying a higher feasible real wage.
The …rm and the worker bargain over the hourly wage and the number
of work-hours. Prices are taken as given. The Nash bargaining problem for
6See Holmlund (2001) for further discussion of and motivation for this speci…cation of
vacancy costs in a model with endogenous work-hours.
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j = G;Z





i, can be written as
E




1+tj j = G;Z (12)
E




P Zz0 (hj) ¡ wj
P jy ¡ wj (1 + tj)
¸
J
j j = G;Z (13)
w h e r ew eh a v ei m p o s e ds y m m e t r ya n dt h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o n ,V j =0 .
Work-hours are obtained by dividing eqs. (12) and (13) for j = G;Z, respec-

















Eqs. (14) and (15) state that the value of the marginal product in home
production (the left-hand sides) equals the tax adjusted value of the marginal
product in market work (the right-hand sides). Note that an increase in the
relative price of services increases home production (reduces work-hours) in
the goods sector. In the service sector, however, relative price changes have
no e¤ect on time allocation since the e¤ects on the value of home production
and the value of market production o¤set each other.
Bargained wages in the two sectors as functions of labor market tightness
can be solved from (12), using also eqs. (5) – (7), (9), (10) and imposing the
free entry condition V =0 . The equations for bargained real producer wages



















































and referred to as the wedge.
Bargained wages in a particular sector depend on labor market tight-
ness in both sectors, an implication of the fact that the unemployed worker
searches over both sectors. Treating the relative price of services as …xed for a
moment, the …rst line on the right-hand side of eq. (16) captures the impact
of conditions in the G-sector on wages in that sector; analogously, the …rst
line of eq. (17) captures own-sector e¤ects on Z-wages. Note also that wages
depend on home production; the larger home production when unemployed
relative to home production when employed, the higher are bargained real
wages.
There is a slight but important asymmetry between the two wage equa-
tions. Consider the …rst lines of eqs. (16) and (17). In both equations,
payroll tax rates interact with the productivity di¤erential zu ¡ zj.T h et a x
rates also interact with the relative price of services, P Z=P G, but only in
the goods sector. The …rst line of (16) includes a relative price term that
captures the value of home production relative to the value of market output
in the goods sector. The higher the value of home production relative to
the value of market production, the higher the wage pressure in that sector.
The relative price does not appear in the service sector by the assumption of
perfect substitutability between services produced in the market and in the
household. In the service sector, a lower tax rate reduces labor costs at given
tightness and given wedge, assuming zu >z Z. An analogous argument does
not necessarily hold for tax changes in the goods sector since relative price
10changes may o¤set the “direct” e¤ect of a tax change. It turns out that this
asymmetry has important implications for how sectoral tax di¤erentiation
a¤ects labor market outcomes.
2.4 Equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the model can be solved in a convenient recursive
fashion. By …rst combining the zero-pro…t conditions and the wage equations
we can determine total tightness and the relative price. Knowing tightness
and the relative price we can determine search e¤ort and work-hours, and
thus also household production among employed and unemployed workers.
The unemployment rate is obtained once we know total tightness and search
e¤ort. The sectoral allocation of tightness is …nally determined by means of
an equation that equates aggregate demand and aggregate supply of goods
and services.
We begin with the determination of total tightness and the relative price.
Use the zero-pro…t conditions and the wage equations, i.e., eqs. (11), (16)
and (17), and obtain equations of the form:
·(r + Á)µ
















































from eq. (16). Firms will enter into the two sectors until
the expected discounted pro…ts are equal to the expected vacancy costs. The
expected time it takes to …ll a vacancy, 1=q(µ)=µ
´,i se q u a la c r o s s… r m si n
the two sectors, although vacancy costs per period may di¤er across sectors
as output prices may di¤er.
Note that the derivatives of the right-hand sides of (19) and (20) with re-
spect to lj are zero, an implication of the fact that work-hours are optimally
11determined in the bargains. The right-hand sides are also invariant to deriv-
ative changes of s when search e¤ort is optimally determined by the worker,
recognizing also the free entry condition for vacancies and the sharing rule
for wages.7
In order to characterize the equilibrium it is useful to invoke the following
lemma:
Lemma 1: The equilibrium allocation of time involves hu >h j and hence
lj >sas well as zu >z j, j = G;Z.
Proof See Appendix A.
The model has thus the empirically plausible implication that unemployed
workers spend more time in home production than employed workers do. As
will become clear in the subsequent analysis, this property has also implica-
tions for how taxes a¤ect labor market outcomes.
Eqs. (19) and (20) include three endogenous variables, i.e., µ
G, µ
Z and
¢ (once lj and s are substituted out by means of the relevant …rst-order
















y¢ (zu ¡ zG)(1+tZ)
i
¡ ·(r + Á)µ
´
(21)
where the derivatives of the right-hand side with respect to lj and s are zero.
Inspection of (21) reveals that ¢=1is a solution to the equation. It can be
shown that this is also the unique solution:
Lemma 2: The unique equilibrium of the model entails ¢=1 , i.e.,




Proof See Appendix B.














12The solution has an important property, namely that the relative price
is …xed by the relative tax ratio. The relative price is thus independent of
consumers’ preferences for goods and services. A tax cut on services increases
the supply of services relative to the supply of goods, which in turn induces
a decline in the price of services relative to the price of goods.













Work-hours are thus equal across sectors, i.e., lG = lZ = l, implying also
zG = zZ = ze.S e a r c hi n t e n s i t yb yt h eu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r ,a saf u n c t i o no f
total labor market tightness, is obtained by invoking ¢=1together with












By imposing ¢=1in eq. (19) and recognizing (22) and (23) we get an
equation that determines total tightness:
·(r + Á)µ













where the right-hand side is invariant to derivative changes of l and s,a n
envelope property already alluded to. With total tightness and search e¤ort
determined we obtain the unemployment rate from eq. (4) and real wages
from eqs. (16) and (17). Note also that the equilibrium with ¢=1involves
equal wages across sectors, i.e., wG = wZ = w.
The equilibrium outcomes described so far are entirely supply determined,
i.e., they do not depend on shifts in consumer preferences for goods and ser-
vices. However, to determine sectoral employment levels we need to explicitly
consider the demand side. For completeness we sketch also this derivation.
With homothetic preferences we have the aggregate demand function for
the two goods given from the …rst-order condition for the individual con-
sumer’s optimal mix of commodities, i.e., ÀG (G;Z)=ÀZ (G;Z)=PG=PZ,
13in conjunction with the aggregate budget constraint. The relative price
is obtained by equating demand and supply of commodities. The aggre-
gate supply of goods is given by Y G = ynGl ¡ vG·y, whereas the aggre-
gate supply of services is given by the supply of market produced services
and the aggregate volume of home production, i.e., Y Z = ynZl ¡ vZ·y +
(1 ¡ u)ze + uzu. Equate aggregate demand and aggregate supply and use









= P G=PZ. The relative price PG=P Z




=@(Y G=Y Z) < 0. Next we use eqs. (2) – (4), (18) and ¢=1
to substitute out the relative price and obtain a relationship between total
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With total tightness and time allocation already determined, we obtain
relative tightness from (25) and (26). Relative sector employment is obtained
by noting that nZ=nG = µ
Z=µ
G is implied by the ‡ow equilibrium conditions.
This completes the analysis of the equilibrium of the model.8
3 Tax Policy
We now examine how tax polices a¤ect labor market outcomes. The govern-





G = R (27)
8We have ignored the government’s budget restriction so far, asuming that the budget
can always be balanced by adjustment of the lump sum subsidy to the individuals.
14where R is the lump sum transfer to the individuals. A cut in tZ can be
…nanced either by an adjustment in tG or by an adjustment of R.W e c a n
derive the following results:
Proposition 1 (i) A reduction in tZ followed by adjustments in tG or R
increases total tightness, reduces unemployment and increases hours of work
a n ds e a r c hi n t e n s i t y . (ii) A change in tG followed by an adjustment in R
has no e¤ect on total tightness, unemployment, hours of work and search
intensity.
Proof Di¤erentiate eq. (24) implicitly to derive the e¤ect on tightness,
recognizing Lemma 1 and the envelope property that (24) is invariant to
derivative changes in search and work-hours. Use eqs. (22) and (23) to
derive the e¤ects on work-hours and search intensity and eq. (4) to obtain
the e¤ect on unemployment. Note that tG and R do not appear in any of the
relevant equations and hence cannot a¤ect any of the variables of interest.
The intuition for these results are as follows. Consider a cut in the service
sector payroll tax rate, tZ. The immediate e¤ect is a decline in producer costs
among …rms producing services. This initiates entry of new vacancies into
the service sector, thereby increasing the value of unemployment. Bargained
wages therefore rise in both sectors. Higher producer costs in the goods sector
drive …rms out of that sector and into the service sector. This sectoral real-
location of …rms increases the market production of services and reduces the
market production of goods, thereby reducing the price of services relative
to the price of goods. The relative price adjustments will restore the equilib-
rium since the increase in the price of goods eventually makes it pro…table
to produce goods and the reduced price on services eventually eliminate the
pro…tability of entering the service sector. The new equilibrium is associated
with lower producer costs in both sectors and lower unemployment.
Why does not the rise in bargained wages completely o¤set the decline in
producer costs? The reason is the presence of untaxed home production, and
in particular the fact that home production during unemployment exceeds
home production during employment, i.e., zu >z e.T h i si si m m e d i a t e l yc l e a r
from eq. (24); taxes on services would not matter in the absence of home
15production. With untaxed home production, however, a policy that raises
workers’ take-home pay in the market sector makes it more valuable to be
employed relative to being unemployed. A tax cut therefore increases the
attractiveness of employment relative to unemployment. Stated di¤erently,
a tax cut makes it less attractive to engage in tax avoidance by working in
the household sector.
This result can be compared to a standard feature of equilibrium models
of unemployment, namely that taxes are neutral with respect to unemploy-
ment as long as unemployment bene…ts are indexed to real take-home wages
(see, for example, Pissarides, 1998). With a …xed replacement rate in unem-
ployment insurance, and absent home production, any tax cut is typically
completely o¤set by a rise in wages; the indexation of bene…ts to wages intro-
duces additional upward pressure on wages as taxes are reduced. Our model
would reproduce the standard result if home production were ignored and
the sectors were completely symmetric (as we have assumed).9
It is useful to glance at the equations for bargained wages – eqs. (16) and
(17) – to get some further feel for the mechanisms involved. Consider …rst
how a cut in tZ a¤ects the service sector. A lowering of tZ induces a down-
ward shift of the wage-setting schedule; i.e., a decline in real producer wages
given tightness. This allows an expansion of market output and employment
in the service sector. Note that the price of home produced commodities
relative to the price of market production is …xed in the service sector, an
implication of perfect substitutability between household-produced services
market-produced services.
Now consider how a cut in tZ a¤ects bargained wages in the goods sector.
A reduction of tZ produces a downward shift of the wage-setting schedule
also in the goods sector, but the reason here is the relative price adjustment.
The tax cut on services induces a decline in the value of services (home
9If the sectors had not been symmetric, it would in general be possible to in‡uence
total tightness and unemployment by changes in relative tax pressure even absent home
production. This is analogous to the e¤ects of sectoral tax policies in non-symmetric
two-sector models of union bargaining discussed in Kolm (1998) and Holmlund and Kolm
(2000).
16production) relative to the market value of goods, i.e., a decline in PZ=PG.
As work-hours are determined in the bargains by the tax adjusted value
of the marginal product in market work, hours in the service sector increase
with a reduction in tZ as market work becomes less taxed relative to home
work. Hours increase also in the goods sector with a reduction in tZ as the
relative price P Z=P G falls, which raises the value of market work relative
to home work in the sector. Search intensity increases with a reduction in
tZ both because tZ is directly reduced and because total tightness increases.
Both e¤ects increase the returns to search.
Changes in tG do not a¤ect output, employment and hours in our model.
Budget balance can thus be achieved by adjustment of tG without any reper-
cussions on the labor market outcomes of main interest. Consider again the
equations for bargained wages. Had the relative price been …xed, a cut in tG
would lower real producer costs in the goods sector, thereby raising employ-
ment. But the relative price is not …xed; it is in fact highly responsive to
tax changes. A cut in tG causes an equiproportionate increase in P Z=P G as
the supply of goods increases relative to the supply of services. This relative
price adjustment completely o¤sets the tax reduction. This adjustment in
the value of home production is analogous to the adjustment of bene…t levels
that takes place when the replacement rate is …xed.
Moreover, changes in tG will have no impact on work-hours and search
intensity. Hours in the service sector are not a¤ected as tG has no impact
on the tax adjusted value of the marginal product in market work. Hours
in the goods sector are directly a¤ected by changes in tG but this e¤ect is
counteracted by adjustments in the relative price, leaving work-hours in the
goods sector unaltered as well. Search intensity is una¤ected by adjustment
in tG as total tightness is una¤ected and so is the tax adjusted value of the
marginal product in market work in the two sectors. Hence, as the pay-o¤
to search is una¤ected by changes in tG, so is search intensity.
174W e l f a r e
We have seen that a tax cut on services unambiguously reduces unemploy-
ment. Does such a reform also represent a welfare improvement? Consider a





Z + urU (28)
Substitute the expressions for the value functions given by eqs. (5) – (7)
into eq. (28), impose the ‡ow equilibrium conditions given by eqs. (2) – (4)
and the government’s budget restriction (27), and substitute the expression
for aggregate pro…ts into eq. (28). Finally take the limit of the resulting
expression as the discount rate approaches zero, i.e., r ! 0.B y i g n o r i n g
discounting we can compare di¤erent steady states without having to con-
sider the adjustment process. This yields the following expression for social
welfare:
W =
P GY G + P ZY Z
P (PG;PZ)
(29)
where Y G = nG(l ¡ ·Áµ
´)y is aggregate consumption of goods, and Y Z =
nZ (l ¡ ·Áµ
´)y+(1¡u)ze+uzu is the aggregate consumption of services which
consists of market produced services as well as home produced services. The
social welfare measure is thus simply given by real aggregate consumption.
By dividing the numerator and the denominator by P Z, and using the fact
that the price level is linearly homogenous in the sector prices, we obtain a




Y G + Y Z
P (P G=PZ;1)
(30)
Does a tax reform that involves a switch from uniform to di¤erentiated
taxation represent a welfare improvement? The following proposition sum-
marizes the results:
Proposition 2 Consider an initial situation with uniform taxation, i.e.,
tG=tZ = t ¸ 0. (i) Social welfare is invariant to tax di¤erentiation provided
18that the government has no revenue requirement, i.e., t =0 , and provided
that ¯ = ´ holds. (ii) Social welfare is increased by tax di¤erentiation involv-
ing tG >t Z provided that the initial tax rates are positive, i.e., t>0,a n d
¯ ¸ ´.
Proof Di¤erentiate (30) with respect to tZ while adjusting tG so as to
recognize the government’s budget restriction, tG = tG(tZ).E v a l u a t e a t





















where ­i > 0, i =1 ;:::;4, @µ=@tZ < 0;@ s = @ t Z < 0 and @l=@tZ < 0;s e e
Appendix C for de…nitions of ­i and other details. Thus: (i) dW=dtZ =0if
¯ = ´ and t =0 ; (ii) dW=dtZ < 0 if ¯ ¸ ´ and t>0.
The …rst part of the proposition is a restatement of the so-called Hosios
condition: the policy-free equilibrium, i.e., t =0 , is constrained e¢cient
provided that the elasticity of matching with respect to the e¤ective number
of searchers is equal to the power of the worker in the Nash bargain, i.e.,
¯ = ´. There is then no reason to use sectoral tax di¤erentiation so as to
remove ine¢ciencies caused by search externalities. The second part of the
proposition states that tax di¤erentiation is always welfare improving when
the government has a revenue requirement provided that ¯ ¸ ´ holds; note
that ¯ ¸ ´ is a su¢ciency condition. If a policy-free equilibrium involved
¯>´ , it would imply that tightness would be too low and unemployment
too high.
The incentives for tax di¤erentiation when t>0 arise from three “…scal”
externalities associated with tightness, search and work-hours; cf. the ex-
pressions within the squared brackets above. A cut in tZ accompanied by a
rise in tG is welfare improving by increasing tightness, increasing search and
increasing work-hours. These changes raise total man-hours and thereby the
tax base. This in turn allows a rise in total private consumption without any
o¤setting decline in government revenues.
19In conclusion, we have derived su¢cient conditions under which tax di¤er-
entiation would be welfare improving. It follows immediately that a uniform
tax structure cannot be optimal; there will always exist a better alternative
where taxes on services are lower than taxes on goods. As we will see, the
welfare gains from a switch from a uniform to a di¤erentiated tax system
m a yw e l lb es u b s t a n t i a l .
5 Numerical Results
We now turn to numerical calibrations of the model so as to get some feel for
the magnitude of the optimal tax di¤erentiation and the associated welfare
gains. Preferences for goods and services are represented by a Cobb-Douglas
utility function. To check how sensitive the results are to alternative as-
sumptions concerning preferences we also consider utility functions of the
CES variety.
With Cobb-Douglas preferences we have À(G;Z)=G¾Z1¡¾,w h e r ew e
set ¾ =0 :5. The matching function is given by H = mv1¡´(su)´.W e a l s o
assume that the worker’s share of the total match surplus equals the elasticity
of matching with respect to unemployment, i.e., ¯ = ´;t h i si st h eH o s i o s -
condition already referred to. We set ¯ = ´ =0 :5. The home production





j¢b j = G;Z (31)
and analogously for zu = z(hu). The production functions are strictly con-
cave so b<1. The assumption that productivity in home production rises
along with productivity in market production has the realistic implication
that unemployment is constant along a balanced growth path, i.e., unemploy-
ment is independent of the level of productivity.10 The unemployed worker’s
time in home production is obtained by using eqs. (22) – (24). The day
10It also follows that the worker’s time allocation is independent of the level of productiv-
ity. To see that productivity does not a¤ect time allocation and unemployment, invoke (22)
to obtain @lj=@y =0and use (23), (24) and (4) to obtain @s=@y = @lj=@y = @u=@y =0 .
20is taken as time unit, y is normalized to 100 and the separation rate, equal
across sectors, is given as Á =0 :25=365. The parameters ·, a, b and m
were chosen so as to obtain “reasonable” values of unemployment and the
elasticity of hours with respect to tax rates, i.e., »
l
t ´¡ @ lnlj=@ ln(1 + t).
The implied elasticity of »
l
t for a uniform tax rate is 0:3 when the govern-
ment absorbs 25 percent of GDP.11 Note however that our functional form
assumption implies that the elasticity is increasing in the tax rate; we have
»
l
t = ¡(h=l)(1¡ b)
¡1 where h=l increases in the tax rate. We set the real
interest rate to zero so that we only need to compare steady states.
A utilitarian welfare function can, by the linear homogeneity of the utility
function, be represented by real aggregate consumption as in eq. (29) above.
We assume that the government has a real revenue requirement, R ´ R=P,
and returns tax revenues as lump-sum real transfers to each individual in the
economy. The two policy instruments are the tax rates, tG and tZ.
The results of the simulations with Cobb-Douglas utility are presented
in Table 1. Consider …rst the experiment with uniform taxation. A rising
revenue requirement is associated with steeply rising tax rates. The unem-
ployment rate increases from 6.2 percent to 8.2 percent as payroll tax rates
rise from 14 to 81 percent. A “La¤er e¤ect” kicks in at R =3 0with uniform
taxation. It is then possible to reduce tZ without any compensating increase
in tG.
Consider next what happens when the government chooses the two tax
rates optimally. The magnitude of the optimal tax di¤erential is substantial
when the government absorbs a large fraction of GDP. For example, we have
tG =0 :75 and tZ =0 :40 when the revenue requirement amounts to approxi-
mately 40 percent of GDP. There is only a slight increase in unemployment
associated with rising revenue requirements when taxes are optimally di¤er-
entiated.
11The survey by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) reports estimates of labor supply elastic-
ities around 0.10 on average for males and around 0.7 on average for females. These elas-
ticities are typically estimated under the assumption that work-hours are at the worker’s
discretion.
21Table 1. The E¤ects of Tax Di¤erentiation, Cobb-Douglas utility.
Parameters: ¯ = ´ = :5, y =1 0 0 , · = :674, a = :5,b = :6, m = :01, r =0 ,
Á = :25=365, ¾ =0 :5.
R R
GDPunif tt G tZ uu n G nG nZ nZ ¢W
unif opt opt unif opt unif opt unif opt %
10 .12 .14 .16 .11 .062 .061 .53 .51 .41 .42 .0
20 .25 .34 .39 .25 .065 .064 .54 .51 .39 .43 .3
25 .33 .49 .57 .33 .069 .065 .56 .50 .37 .44 .8
26 .35 .53 .61 .34 .070 .065 .56 .50 .37 .44 1.0
27 .37 .58 .65 .36 .071 .066 .57 .50 .36 .44 1.2
28 .39 .63 .70 .38 .073 .066 .58 .49 .35 .44 1.7
29 .41 .70 .75 .40 .076 .066 .58 .49 .34 .45 2.3
30 .45 .81 .81 .42 .082 .067 .60 .48 .32 .45 3.7
The last column shows welfare changes, measured in percent of total
consumption, of moving from a uniform to an optimally di¤erentiated tax
system. The welfare gain amounts to 1 percent when the government absorbs
35 percent of GDP; the corresponding gain is 3.7 percent when 45 percent of
GDP is absorbed. Taken at face values, these numbers suggest substantial
welfare gains arising from optimal tax di¤erentiation.
How sensitive are these results with respect to the particular utility func-





¡Â +( 1¡ ±)Z
¡Â¤¡1
Â (32)
for ¡1 · Â<1. The elasticity of substitution is given by ²s =1 =(1 + Â).
We examine two cases with “low” and “high” elasticity of substitution: ²s =
1=3 and ²s =2 . The other parameters are left intact. The results are given
in Table 2 and Table 3.
22Table 2. The E¤ects of Tax Di¤erentiation, CES utility with ²s =1 =3.
The other parameters are as in Table 1.
R R
GDPunif tt G tZ uu n G nG nZ nZ ¢W
unif opt opt unif opt unif opt unif opt %
10 .12 .14 .18 .08 .062 .061 .53 .51 .41 .42 .1
20 .25 .34 .44 .17 .065 .062 .54 .51 .40 .43 .5
25 .33 .50 .62 .21 .069 .063 .56 .51 .37 .43 1.2
26 .35 .53 .67 .22 .070 .063 .56 .51 .37 .43 1.5
27 .37 .58 .71 .23 .071 .063 .57 .50 .36 .43 1.9
28 .39 .63 .75 .24 .073 .063 .58 .50 .35 .43 2.4
29 .41 .70 .80 .24 .076 .063 .58 .50 .34 .43 3.2
30 .45 .81 .85 .25 .082 .064 .60 .50 .32 .44 4.7
Table 3. The E¤ects of Tax Di¤erentiation, CES utility with ²s =2 .
The other parameters are as in Table 1.
R R
GDPunif tt G tZ uu n G nG nZ nZ ¢W
unif opt opt unif opt unif opt unif opt %
10 .12 .14 .15 .12 .062 .062 .53 .51 .41 .42 .0
20 .25 .34 .37 .28 .065 .064 .54 .50 .39 .43 .2
25 .33 .49 .54 .39 .066 .066 .56 .49 .37 .44 .5
26 .35 .53 .58 .41 .070 .067 .56 .49 .37 .44 .6
27 .37 .58 .63 .44 .071 .067 .57 .48 .36 .45 .8
28 .39 .63 .68 .46 .073 .068 .58 .48 .35 .45 1.2
29 .41 .70 .73 .49 .076 .069 .58 .48 .34 .46 1.7
30 .45 .81 .79 .52 .082 .070 .60 .47 .32 .46 2.9
The basic message from the CES experiments is that the optimal tax
di¤erential is considerably larger when the lower value of the elasticity of
substitution applies. Moreover, the welfare gain from tax di¤erentiation is
23much higher in this case. The reason why the elasticity of substitution mat-
ters is that it a¤ects consumption choices in response to tax induced changes
in relative prices. If the elasticity is large, a given tax di¤erentiation induces
large changes in consumer demand towards services and away from goods.
If the elasticity is small, a given tax di¤erentiation produces only modest
changes of consumption decisions. In the extreme case, as the CES function
approaches the Leontief function with "s ! 0, there will be no changes in
consumption decisions. The less substitutable goods and services are, the
more scope for tax di¤erentiation as the associated distortions of consump-
tion decisions are less pronounced. Indeed, with "s ! 0 we …nd that tZ ! 0.
Taxes should in this case be exclusively levied on the goods sector.
6E x t e n s i o n s
6.1 Directed Search
We have assumed undirected random search, i.e., workers do not direct their
search towards any particular sector. It is arguably more realistic to consider
directed search where workers choose which sector to search in; some unem-
ployed workers apply for jobs in the goods sector and the rest in the service
sector. We sketch a version of the model with directed search and show
that equilibrium outcomes are independent of whether search is directed or
undirected.










where uj is the number of workers that allocate search to sector j.F r o m











. Notice that these rates depend on the number of e¤ective
searchers in sector j.
24The value functions for a worker can then be written as:
rU
j =














for j = G;Z. Home production in sector j is denoted zuj if the worker is
unemployed and as zej if she is employed. A natural equilibrium condition
in this setting is the indi¤erence condition rUG = rUZ.W o r k e r s c h o o s e
w h i c hs e c t o rt os e a r c hi no nt h eb a s i so fac o m p a r i s o nb e t w e e nt h ep r e s e n t
values of search. The pools of searchers adjust so that indi¤erence holds in
equilibrium.
Given these assumptions, it is straightforward to derive equations for
search, wages and tightness. The arbitrage equations for …rms have the
same basic structure as with undirected search although it is sector-speci…c
tightness that matters. The free entry condition takes the form:
wj (1 + tj)lj









and the equations for bargained real producer wages can be written as
wj (1 + tj)lj





















which corresponds to the …rst lines of the wage equations with undirected
search, i.e., eqs. (16) and (17). Only sector-speci…c labor market condi-
tions matter with directed search. The free entry conditions and the wage









































25where ¢ is the wedge as de…ned above.
By using the …rst-order conditions for optimal search and optimal hours
for the service sector we note that (39) determines µ
Z. Using the …rst-order
conditions we then also get lZ and sZ,a sw e l la szeZ and zuZ.T od e t e r m i n e
the wedge, invoke the indi¤erence condition rUG = rUZ in conjunction with
























As with undirected search, ¢=1is a solution to the problem. With
¢=1we get µ
G = µ
Z = µ, sZ = sG = s, zuZ = zuG = zu.M o r e o v e r w e
have vZ=uZ = vG=uG, implying that a sector with more vacancies will attract
more unemployed searchers. To determine total unemployment, use eq. (4)
above. To obtain sectoral employment we need to invoke the demand side,
as in eq. (25).
The analysis of tax policies under directed search is analogous to what
we have presented in sections 3 and 4. The results are identical.
6.2 Value Added Taxes
Our basic results regarding di¤erentiated payroll taxes carry over to the case
with value added taxes (VAT). Let ¿j denote the tax rate on …rms’ value



























where Pj is the consumer price and Pj (1 ¡ ¿j) the producer price. With
free entry of vacancies we obtain a free-entry condition for sector j:
wjlj
















Proceeding to the wage equations we obtain counterparts to (16) and (17)
with (1 + tj) replaced by (1 ¡ ¿j)
¡1; this holds also in the expression for ¢.
We also rediscover (19) and (20). Hence our results regarding the e¤ects of
payroll taxes carry over to value added taxes. The welfare analysis is also
















j (l ¡ ·Áµ
´)y (45)











j [l ¡ ·(r + Á)µ
´]y (46)
so the two tax bases coincide when r =0 . This is simply an implication of
the fact that a VAT applies to the wage bill plus aggregate pro…ts, noting
that aggregate pro…ts is given as ¦=( 1¡u)(yl¡wl)¡v·y =( 1¡u)r·yµ
´.
Hence, ¦=0as r =0 .
6.3 Unemployment Bene…ts
We have ignored unemployment bene…ts in the main analysis; indeed, there
is no rationale for bene…ts in this economy with risk neutral agents. For
the sake of realism, consider bene…ts paid to unemployed workers indexed to
(general) labor earnings at the …xed replacement rate ½, i.e., Bj = ½wjlj,w i t h
½ 2 [0;1). Bj is taken as …xed in the wage bargains although it is endogenous



















































where ¯1 =( 1¡ ¯)=[1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)½] and ¯2 = ¯=[1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)½]. Note that
¯1 + ¯2 · 1 as ½ ¸ 0. By invoking the free entry conditions we can derive:
·(r + Á)µ






where ¢=1is imposed. The right-hand side of (49) is invariant to derivative
changes in s. However, it is generally not invariant to changes in l;i ti s
straightforward to verify that the right-hand side is decreasing in l for ½>0.
T h ee n v e l o p ep r o p e r t yt h a th o l d sf o r½ =0does not carry over to the case
with ½>0, the reason being that workers and …rms do not internalize the
e¤ects on bene…ts of their wage decisions.
As is clear from (49), taxes on goods have no e¤ect on tightness; this
result is crucially dependent on the assumption that bene…ts are indexed to
wages through a …xed replacement rate. The tax rate on services generally
in‡uences tightness, however. In addition to the e¤ect already discussed,
there is now also an induced “bene…t e¤ect” that operates through work-

















t ´¡ @ lnl=@ ln(1 + tZ) is the elasticity of work-hours with respect
to the tax rate. The inequality ze <z u is no longer su¢cient to guarantee
an e g a t i v es i g nw h e n½>0. A cut in the service sector tax rate induces a
rise in work-hours and thereby in the bene…t level; this in turn tends to raise
wage pressure. The net e¤ect on tightness is in general ambiguous.
We have undertaken a number of calibrations with a positive replacement
rate (½ =0 :3). With two exceptions, the same parameters as in the earlier
28s i m u l a t i o n sw e r eu s e d .T h ee x c e p t i o n sp e r t a i n st oa and m;w en o ws e ta =
0:3,a n dm =0 :008 so as to obtain reasonable unemployment …gures. The
experiments always suggest that tax di¤erentiation increases employment
and welfare. The welfare gains from optimal di¤erentiation is non-negligible.
For example, the gain amounts to 2 percent of total consumption when the
government absorbs 26 percent of GDP.
6.4 Hours Determined by the Worker
Our next variation on the theme brie‡y considers the case where work-hours
are set at the employed worker’s discretion. Suppose that the employed
worker allocates time so as to maximize rEj, taking the wage as given. As-







implying that the marginal productivity of home production equals the real
wage in units of services. Since the production function is strictly concave,
it follows immediately that a rise in the wage causes a reduction in time
spent in home production and an increase in time spent in market work:
@hj=@wj < 0 and @lj=@wj > 0. The …rst-order condition for the Nash
bargain can be written as:
E














where the free entry condition V =0is imposed and "j ´ wjl0(wj)=l(wj) > 0
is the wage elasticity of labor supply. The expression in the squared brackets
must be positive for an interior solution of the wage bargain. A higher wage
has a direct negative e¤ect of the value of the …rm but also an o¤setting
positive e¤ect arising from the fact that the higher wage encourages labor
supply. The cost to the …rm of a higher wage is declining in the wage elasticity
of labor supply.
29One can work out the comparative statics of this problem along the same
lines as with bargaining over wages. The results are similar although some-
what more complex. The additional complexity arises because the tax in-
‡uences work-hours through its e¤ect on the wage. Our numerical exercises
suggest that the welfare gains from tax di¤erentiation are of the same order
of magnitude as with bargaining over hours.
6.5 Distributional Issues
We have so far ignored distributional issues. Indeed, distributional con‡icts
do not appear as long as workers are identical and discounting is ignored. In
this case workers’ “permanent incomes” are identical, i.e., rU = rE,a n dt h e
timing of spells of unemployment and employment does not matter. However,
if r>0 timing does matter and rE > rU.W eh a v e :
rU =
"
(r + Á)P Zzu + ®(µ)
£
wl + PZze¤
r + Á + ®(µ)






ÁPZzu +[ r + ®(µ)]
£
wl + PZze¤
r + Á + ®(µ)




We have examined the distributional implications of maximization of
steady state welfare, as given by (28), for annual interest rates equal to 0:05
and 0:10, respectively. Table 4 presents results for r =0 :10.T h e o p t i m a l
policy causes a tiny decline in the permanent income ratio, i.e., rU=rE.12
However, tax di¤erentiation improves steady state levels of welfare for both
employed and unemployed workers. The fact that both groups gain from tax
di¤erentiation is driven by a higher level of labor market tightness associated
with the optimal policy.
12For ¹ R =2 9the ratio is 0:987 with uniform taxation and 0:986 with optimal di¤eren-
tiation.
30Table 4. The E¤ects of Tax Di¤erentiation with Discounting (r =0 :10=365)
and Cobb-Douglas utility. Parameters (except r) as in Table 1.
R tt G tZ uu ¢Wr Ur Ur Er E
unif opt opt unif opt % unif opt unif opt
10 .14 .16 .11 .064 .064 0.0 90.9 90.9 92.7 92.7
20 .35 .41 .25 .069 .066 0.3 90.4 90.6 91.9 92.2
25 .52 .60 .34 .074 .068 1.0 89.4 90.2 90.7 91.6
26 .57 .64 .35 .076 .069 1.3 89.0 90.1 90.3 91.4
27 .62 .69 .37 .079 .069 1.7 88.5 89.9 88.5 91.3
28 .69 .74 .39 .083 .070 2.4 87.7 89.8 88.9 91.1
29 .82 .80 .41 .092 .070 4.2 86.1 89.6 87.2 90.9
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have developed a two-sector general equilibrium model of search unem-
ployment in order to examine the case for sectoral tax di¤erentiation. In
particular, we have analyzed how taxes a¤ect labor market outcomes when
services produced in the market can also be produced within the household.
The analytical results are unambiguous when unemployment bene…ts are ig-
nored: a tax cut on services reduces unemployment whereas a tax cut on
goods has no e¤ect. A reform that introduces tax di¤erentiation, with lower
taxes on services, is also welfare improving. The numerical results suggest
that the welfare gains from optimal tax di¤erentiation may well be substan-
tial; this holds irrespective of whether or not unemployment bene…ts are
taken into account. Of course, the speci…c numbers are sensitive to the de-
tails of the calibration but the general features of the results appear to be
fairly robust.
All workers are ex ante identical in our analysis; heterogeneity arises ex
post as some workers become employed whereas others become unemployed.
This is a useful simpli…cation as long as we focus on e¢ciency aspects of
sectoral tax di¤erentiation. It is however an unsatisfactory assumption if
31one takes distributional issues seriously. Indeed, one argument sometimes
voiced in favor of lower taxes on household services is that such reforms might
encourage employment especially among less skilled workers. To address this
issue, the analysis has to be extended to incorporate heterogeneous labor.
Finally, we suggest that our framework can be usefully adapted to an
analysis of tax evasion behavior and policies to prevent tax evasion.13 This,
however, would be a di¤erent paper.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
We want to show that hu >h j, and hence s<l j and zu >z j for j = G;Z.





























































where (A2) corresponds to (19) and (A3) to (20). By inspection of (A1),





































The proof is by contradiction. Consider …rst hu and hG and assume




z (hj) ¡ z(hu)
hj ¡ hu =
z (hj) ¡ z(hu)
s ¡ lj (A6)
13See Kolm and Larsen (2001) for an analysis along these lines.

























which is a contradiction since z0(hu) <z 0(hG) implies hu >h G and s<l G.
Thus hu >h G, s<l G and zu >z G must hold.


























which is a contradiction since z0(hu) <z 0(hZ) implies hu >h Z and s<l Z.
Thus also hu >h Z, s<l Z and zu >z Z must hold. This completes the proof.
¥
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
We want to show that ¢=1is the unique solution to eq. (21) in the main
text. To that end we make the following de…nitions:


























g(¢) ´ ·(r + Á)[µ(¢)]
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= sign[f(¢) ¡ h(¢)]
since h(¢) ¡ g(¢) > 0 follows from eq. (19) in the main text.
The proof is by contradiction in two steps. We …rst consider possible
solutions involving ¢ > 1 and then turn to solutions where ¢ < 1.
(i) Assume ¢ > 1, i.e., (¢ ¡ 1) > 0
Consider the di¤erence f(¢) ¡ h(¢) and rearrange to obtain:






















































so we have A(¢ > 1) < 0.
Since zu >z Z b yL e m m a1w eo b t a i nB(1) = 0 and B(¢ > 1) > 0.W e
then get
sign[f(¢) ¡ h(¢)] = sign[A ¡ B] < 0
for ¢ > 1.T h ea s s u m p t i o n¢ > 1 thus leads to a contradiction.
(ii) Assume ¢ < 1,i . e . ,(¢ ¡ 1) < 0
Rearrange the expression for f(¢) ¡ h(¢) as follows:












































implying C(¢ < 1) > 0.
Since zu >z G b yL e m m a1w eo b t a i nD(1) = 0 and D(¢ < 1) < 0 and
hence:
sign[f(¢) ¡ h(¢)] = sign[C ¡ D] > 0
for ¢ < 1. The assumption ¢ < 1 thus also leads to a contradiction. This
completes the proof. ¥
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
We want to show that dW=dtZ < 0 when we evaluate at tZ = tG = t>0 and
recognize tG = tG ¡
tZ¢








































35for j = G;Z. To simplify (C1) we need to look at the individual’s consump-
tion decision. Suppose that consumer i maximizes a linearly homogenous util-
ity function À(Gi;Z i) subject to the budget restriction Ii = PGGi +Zi.T h e
indirect utility function corresponding to this problem is given as ~ Ài = Ii=P,






















P GY G + Y Z (C4)
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Z =( 1¡ u)(l ¡ ·Áµ
´)y +( 1¡ u)z
e + uz
u
and recall that Proposition 1 implies @
¡
Y G + Y Z¢
=@tG =0 .H e n c e@W=@tG =









when tG = tZ = t. We can then proceed by deriving @
¡
Y G + Y Z¢
=@tZ.
After some tedious algebra we obtain:
36@
¡
Y G + Y Z¢







































Moreover, @µ=@tZ < 0;@ s = @ t Z < 0 and @l=@tZ < 0.W e t h u s h a v e :(i)
dW=dtZ =0if ¯ = ´ and t =0 ; (ii) dW=dtZ < 0 if ¯ ¸ ´ and t>0. ¥
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